Soviet T-34 tank and FlaK 88mm guns

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Wy study Winston Churchill?

Quoting the Churchill Centre:

Why study Winston Churchill? What makes him relevant in the 21st century? Members of the Churchill family and the Churchill Centre answer the question in this video short.

Triumph des Willens

John S. D. Eisenhower ponders about Hitler's isolation and the "Triumph des Willens", after the assassination attempt of July 20.

[...] Except for his left arm, his slight injuries had healed by now; but he remained weak. He was confined to bed for most of the day by order of his personal physician, leaving it only occasionally to receive important visitors.

This confinement was the culmination of Hitler's progressive removal from a life that had once almost completely public. The withdraw actually began soon after the coming of war. After 1940 he made fewer and fewer appearances, leaving the speechmaking largely to Josef Goebbels. Preoccupied with the details of the conduct of military operations, he saw only the highest officials. Now, at Rastenburg, the process was complete. The Wolf did not leave his lair, and his life had narrowed down to the manipulation of symbols on a map, representations that progressively were less associated with units made up of human beings. Reality was rapidly being replaced by a sort of dream.

[...]

After the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, of course, the situation was greatly exacerbated. Now bot the field marshals or the commanding generals of the Heer of the officers of the General Staff Corps could be entrusted with strategic operations. What had been dislike of the officer class turned into bitter distrust. Only to associates of proven loyalty such as Jodl and Keitel were Hitler's plans revealed, and to them only gradually.

By the summer of 1944 many surviving German officers of the highest rank had come to believe, or had convinced themselves, that Hitler possessed keen insight into the nature of war and could produce strategic concepts of striking originality. This was, of course, Hitler's view of himself: "A war leader," he said after his Russian victories, "is what I am against my own will. If I apply my mind to military problems, that's because for the moment I know that nobody would succeed better at this than I can".

The fact is that Hitler had a unusual memory, and because of his extensive reading and continual discussion with experts, he had acquired a fund of knowledge in specialized areas often superior to that of the majority of the senior staff officers. Even Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, one of the few who disagreed openly with Hitler on occasion and survived, continued to respect Hitler's military learning.

But it is one thing acquire a fund of information; it is another to apply that tool with common sense, reason, and discipline.  Herein lay the basic cleavage between Hitler and the members of the professional German Officer Corps. The qualities of hardheaded reason and thoroughness that the General Staff embodied carried little weight with Hitler. The quality most important to a leader, at least to the top of a great nation, was the mystical quality that he termed "fanaticism."

The conception Hitler had of "fanaticism" has little to do with the English or American definition of the word. Americans would agree that Hitler was a fanatic, but they would not understand what he meant by calling himself so. To Hitler a fanatic was a man who believed in the wonder-working providences of his own will. And the fascinating feature of Hitler's personality, the quality that converted skeptics into followers, was precisely power of will. To this his associates attributed the rise and the eventual triumph of Nazism out of obscurity and disgrace [...]

What made Hitler a "revolutionary" in his thinking was a perversion of German romantic idealism, e. g.: man discovers the truth of existence whenever he molds the outside world into conformity with an idea. To live most deeply is to overcome obstacles, to give shape to the recalcitrant world in which one finds oneself.

This during his rise to power Hitler set himself and his followers objectives that seemed impossible to realize, believing that while premeditated calculations would immediately jump the rails, the impossible could always be reached through the energies generated on one's own side and the general paralysis on the enemy's. Hitler held that we must make a dream work - then it will be as real as a panther tank.

When Hitler's obsession with the "primacy of will" is taken into consideration, many of his attitudes and actions can be better understood. It accounts for his supreme confidence in himself as a military leader and for two of the chief tenets in his military doctrine: (1) "Attack is the best defense," a notion that he praised Clausewitz for expressing, and (2) "Troops should never be made to feel uncertain by withdrawal." If only the will to resist is flexible, most requests for withdrawal are superfluous. The German military found that preparing a precautionary defensive line behind the line of present contact was usually impossible, for Hitler normally refused to allow any commander to look over his shoulder. Commanders were defeatists unless the looked for new forward positions to which to advance.

Einsenhower, John S. D.  The battle of the bulge. Pages 106-109.

Coalition II

John S. D. Eisenhower cites Pogue:

A word of caution is necessary for the reader who may be unduly impressed by the accounts of controversy and difference of opinion which arose between commanders of the same nationality, officers of different nationalities, and heads of government... When the discussions of the participants in Allied conferences are seen in cold print, without the benefit of the smile which softened a strong argument or the wry shrug which made clear that the debate was for the record, and when there is no transcript of the friendly conversation which followed the official conference, the reader may get the impression that constant argument and heated controversy marked most meetings between  Allied leaders... It is inevitable that a study of such discussions will emphasize the disagreements and spell out the problems in reaching accords. The numerous basic decisions which were reached with only minor debate attract less attention...

The success of ... an alliance is to be judged ... not by the amount of heat which may be engendered between the powers in their attempts to find a course of action which will most nearly preserve their individual aims while gaining a common goal, but rather by the degree to which the powers, while frankly working on a basis of self-interest, manage to achieve the one aim for which their forces were brought together. On that basis the Western Powers forged a unit seldom, if ever, achieved in the history of grand alliances. Their commanders, while striving to preserve national identity and gain individual honors for their forces, still waged a victorious war.

Eisenhower, John S. D. The battle of the Bulge. Page 99.

Coalition

About the coalitions, John S. D. Eisenhower says:

Yet in the case of High Command in France, another factor had to be given careful consideration - feelings of national pride. Pride in country and tradition is not to be discouraged; a soldier cannot fight without it. But in the highest command echelons of nations that have combined their resources to fight a common enemy, this feeling must often be subordinated to the goo of the whole.

This is not easy. Napoleon's detractors have pointed out that his brilliant campaigns were fought largely against coalitions. The coalition between the British and the Americans in World War II was not automatic, It could be injured, conceivably fatally, despite the fact that the two national political leaders were joint signatories of the Atlantic Charter and despite the intense admiration that Americans felt for Britain as she stood alone in 1940. For this reason, General Eisenhower ruefully concluded when writing his memories in 1948, the concealment of projected command arrangements was a mistake,

 Eisenhower, John S. D. The battle of the Bulge. Page 66.

Never in history was there a coalition like that of our enemies, composed of such  heterogeneous elements with such divergent aims... Even now these states are at loggerheads, and, if we can deliver a few more heavy blows, then this artificially bolstered common front may suddenly collapse with a gigantic clap of thunder.

Adolf Hitler

(upon the ordering the attack through the Ardennes)

Bunkers

Fotos interessantes de bunkers:

http://www.themorningnews.org/archives/galleries/the_frightening_beauty_of_bunkers/07tfbob.php

Chamem o Keynes!

Sobre a necessidade de conduzir a economia de guerra, Churchill instrui o Lord President of the Council:

While the Import and Production Executives necessarily are concerned with the pratical handling of the business committed to them, it is essential that the larger issues of economic policy should be dealt with by your committee, and primarily by you. This is in accordance with the drift of well-informed public opinion. You should summon economists like Keynes to give their views to you personally. [...]

 Churchill, Winston. The grand alliance. Página 102.

Measureless peril

Entre os trabalhos de administrar o Reino Unido durante a guerra, ou conduzir operações militares, Churchill deixa clara a sua preferência em 1941.

[...] Indeed, it was to me almost a relief to turn from these deadly under-tides to the ill-starred but spirited enterprises in the military sphere. How willingly would I have expected a full-scale attempt at invasion for this shapeless, measureless peril, expressed in charts, curves, and statistics!

Churchill, Winston. The grand alliance. Página 101.

Grécia

Em março de 1941, um momento de difícil decisão chegou: ajudar ou não a Grécia, frente a uma possível e cada vez mais próxima invasão italiana ou alemã? Apesar da Inglaterra ter ajudado a Grécia antes, e mesmo ter assumido um compromisso com a Grécia, a situação estava se deteriorando com a indecisão da Turquia e o desenrolar deste teatro. Pesando tudo isso, em 6 de março de 1941, Churchill escreve ao Mr. Eden - que se encontrava em missão especial no Egito e região -, transmitindo a sua opinião, que no momento, era negativa. Sobre isto, escreve:

After reflecting alone at Chequers on the Sunday night upon the Chiefs of Staff paper and the trend of discussion in the War Cabinet that morning I sent the following message to Mr. Eden, who had now left Athens for Cairo. This certainly struck a different note on my part. But I take full responsibility for the eventual decision, because I am sure I could have stopped it all if I had been convinced. Its so much easier to stop than to do.

Churchill, Winston, The grand alliance. Página 90.

Hess e Stalin

A repentina chegada de Rudolph Hess na Escócia causou grandes desconfianças na Rússia, fazendo-os indagar sobre a possibilidade de um pacto entre a Inglaterra e a Alemanha para invadir a Rússia. Abaixo, Churchill descreve uma conversa que teve com Stalin, três anos depois da chegada de Hess.

Considering how closely Hess was knit to Hitler, it is surprising that he did not know of, or that if he knew he did not disclose, the impeding attack on Russia, for which such vast preparations were being made. The Soviet Government were deeply intrigued by the Hess episode, and they wove many distorted theories around it. Three years late when I was in Moscow on my second visit I realised the fascination which this topic had for Stalin. He asked me at the dinner table what was the truth about the Hess mission. I said shortly what I have written here. I had the feeling that he believed there had been some deep negotiation or plot for Germany and Britain to act together in the invasion of Russia which had miscarried. Remembering what a wise man he is, I was surprised to find him silly in this point. When the interpreter made it plain that he did not believe what I said, I replied through my interpreter, "When I make a statement of facts within my knowledge I expected it to be accepted." Stalin receveid this somewhat abrupt responde with a genial grin. "There are lots of things that happen even here in Russia which our Secret Service do not necessarily tell me about." I let it go at that.

Churchill, Winston. The grand alliance. Página 49.

Education for death

Ode on the Death of a Favourite Cat

Sobre o relacionamento de Churchill com Theodore Roosevelt, e o sentimento de Harry Hopkins, um  "close confident and personal agent of the president":

He therefore in some ways bore out the poet Gray's line, "A favourite has no friend".

Churchill, Winston. The grand alliance. Página 21.

Texto completo do poema aqui.

Galeria Life

Não querendo ser repetitivo, mas achei outras galerias fantásticas no site da Life. Coloco-as abaixo:

Dogs of war

Uma galeria bem interessante da Time:



A minha preferida é essa:



E para não esquecer:

1940

Piccadilly Circus, London, 1940

Fim do capítulo Desert Victory, e do livro Their Finest Hour:

We may, I am sure, rate this tremendous year as the most splendid, as it was the mostly deadly, year in our long English and British story. It was a great, quantly-organized England that had destroyed the Spanish Armada. A strong flame of conviction and resolve carried us through the twenty-five years' conflict which William III and Marborough waged against Louis XIV. There was a famous period which Chatham. There was the long struggle against Napoleon, in wich our survival was secured through the domination of the seas by the British Navy under the classic leadership of Nelson and his associates. A million Britons died in the first World War. But nothing surpasses 1940. By the end of that year this small and ancient Island, with its devoted Commonwealth, Dominions, and attachments under every sky, had proved itself capable of bearing the whole impact and weight of world destiny. We had not flinched or wavered. We had not failed. The soul of the British people and race had proved invincible. The citadel of the Commomwealth and Empire could not be stormed. Alone, but upborne by every generous heart-beat of mankind, we had defied the tyrant in the height of his triumph.

All our latent strength was now alive. The air terror had been measured. The Island was intangible, inviolate. Hencefoward we too have weapons with which to fight. Hencefoward we too would be a highly organized was machine. We had shown the world that we could hold our own. There were two sides to the question of Hitler's world domination. Britain, whom so many had counted out, was still in the ring, far strongerthan she had ever been, and gathering strength with every day. Time had once again come over to our side. And not only to our national side. The United States was arming fast and drawing ever nearer to the conflict. Soviet Russia, who with callous miscalculation had adjulged us worthless at the outbreak of the war, and had bought from Germany fleeting immunity and a share of the booty, had also become much stronger and had secured advanced positions for her own defence. Japan seemed for the moment to be overawed by the evident prospect of a prolonged world war, and, anxiosly watching Russia and the United States, mediated profoundly what it would be wise and profitable to do.

And now this Britain, and its far-spread association of states and dependencies, which had seemed on the verge of ruin, whose very heart was about to be pierced, had been for fifteen months concentrated upon the war problem, training its men and devoting all its infinitely-varied vitalities to the struggle. With a gasp of atonishment and relief the smaller neutrals and the subjugated states saw that the stars still shone in the sky. Hope, and within it passion, burned anew in the hearts of hundreds of millions of men. The good cause would triumph. Right would not be trampled down. The flag of Freedom, which in this fateful hour was the Union Jack, would still fly in all the winds that blew.

But I and my faithfull colleagues who brooded with accurate information at the summit of the scene had no lack of cares. The shadow of the U-boat blockade already cast its chill upon us. All our plans depended upon the defeat of this measure. The Battle of France was lost. The Battle of Britain was won. The Battle of the Atlantic had now to be fought.

 Churchill, Winston. Their Finest Hour. Página 556.

Ribbentrop e Molotov

Sobre a reunião entre Ribbentrop e Molotov sobre a divisão das zonas de influência das grandes forças (Alemanha, União Soviética e Japão), Churchill relembra uma conversa com Stalin, após a traição germânica e o alinhamento da União Soviética com os aliados.

When in August 1942 I first visited Moscow I receveid from Stalin's lips a shorter account of this conversation which in no essential differs from the German record, but may be thought more pithy.

"A little time ago," said Stalin, "the great complaint against Molotov was that he was too pro-German. Now everyone says he is too pro-British. But neither of us ever trusted the Germans. For us it was always life and death." I interjected that we had been through this ourselves, and so knew hos they felt. "When Molotov," said the Marshal, "went to see Ribentrop in Berlin in November of 1940 you got wind of it and sent an air raid." I nodded. "When the alarm sounded Ribbentrop led the way down many flights of stairs to a deep shelter sumptuously furnished. When he got inside the raid begun. He shut the door and said to Molotov: 'Now here we are alone together. Why should we not divide?' Molotov said: 'What will England say?', said Ribbentrop, 'is finished. She is no more use as a Power.' 'If that is so,' said Molotov, 'why are we in this shelter, and whose are these bombs which fail?'"

Grécia

Sobre a invasão da Grécia pela Itália:

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (at G. H. Q., Middle East)

[...] Trust you will grasp situations firmly, abandoning negative and passive policies and seizing opportunity which has come into our hands. "Safety first" is the road to ruin in war, even if you had the safety, which you have not. [...]

Churchill, Winston. Their finest hour. Página 477.

Frenchmen!

Discurso proferido por Churchill, em 21 de outubro de 1940.

Trecho original em francês, como foi transmitido:

Em inglês:

Frenchmen!

For more than thirty years in peace and war I have marched with you, and I am marching still along  the same road. To-night I speak to you at your firesides wherever you may be, or whatever your fortunes are. I repeat the prayer around the louis d' or: "Dieu protège la France." Here at home in England, under the fire of the Boche, we do not forget the ties and links that unite us to France, and we are persevering steadfastly and in good heart in the cause of European freedom and fair dealing for the common people of all countries, for which, with you, we drew the sword. When good people get into trouble because they are attacked and heavily smitten by the vile and wicked, they must be very careful not to get at loggerheads with one another. The common enemy is always trying to bring this about, and, of course, in bad luck a lot of things happen which play into the enemy's hands. We must just make the best of things as they come along.

Here in London, which Herr Hitler says he will reduce to ashes, and which his aeroplanes are now bombarding our people and bearing up unflinchingly. Our Air Force has more  than held its own. We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes. But, of course, this for us in only the beginning. Now in 1940, in spite of occasional losses, we have, as ever, command of the seas. In 1914 we shall have the command of the air. Remember what that means. Herr Hitler with his tanks and other mechanical weapons, and also by Fifth Column intrigue with traitors, has managed to subjugate for the time being most of the finest races in Europe, and his little Italian accomplice is trotting along hopefully and hungrily, but rather wearily and very timidly, at his side. They both wish to carve up France and her Empire as if it were a fowl: to one  a leg, to another a wing or perhaps part of the breast. Not only the French Empire will be devoured by these two ugly customers, but Alsace-Lorraine will go once again under the German yoke, and Nice, Savoy, and Corsica - Napoleon's Corsica - will be torn from the fair realm of France. But Herr Hitler is not thinking only of stealing other people's territories, or flinging gobbets of them to his little confederate. I tell you truly what you must believe when I say that this evil man, this monstrous abortion of hatred and defeat, is resolved on nothing less than the complete wiping out of the French nation, and the disintegration of its whole life and future. By all kinds of sly and savage means he is plotting and working to quench for ever the fountain of characteristic French culture and French inspiration to the World. All Europe, if he has his way, will be reduced to one uniform Boche-land, to be exploited, pillaged, and bullied by his Nazi gangsters. You will excuse my speaking frankly, because this is not a time to mince words. Its is not defeat that France will now be made ti suffer at German hands, but the doom of complete obliteration. Army, Navy, Air Force, religion, law, language, culture, institutions, literature, history, tradition, all are to be effaced by the brute strength of a triumphant army and the scientific low-cunning of a ruthless Police Force.

Frenchmen - rearm your spirits before it is too late. Remember how Napoleon said before one of his battles: "These same Prussians who are so boastful to-day were three to one at Jena, and six to one at Montmirail." Never will I believe that the soul of France is dead. Never will I believe that her place amongst the greatest nations of the world has been lost for ever! All these schemes and crimes of Herr Hitler's are bringing upon him and upon all who belong to his system a retribution which many of us will live to see. The story is not yet finished, but it will not be so long. We are on his track, and so are our friends across the Atlantic Ocean, and your friends across the Atlantic Ocean. If he cannot destroy us, we will surely destroy him and all his gang, and all their works. Therefore have hope and faith, for all will come right.

Now what is it we British ask of you in this present hard and bitter time? What we ask at this moment in our struggle to win the victory which we will share with you, is that if you cannot help us, at least you will not hinder us. Presently you will be able to weight the arm that strikes for you, and you ought to do so. But even now we believe that Frenchmen, wherever they may be, feel their hearts warm and a proud blood tingle in their veins when we have some success in the air or on the sea, or presently - for that will come - upon the land.

Remember we shall never stop, never weary, and never give in, and that our whole people and Empire have vowed themselves to the task of cleansing Europe from the Nazi pestilence and saving the world from the new Dark Ages. Do not imagine, as the German-controlled wireless tell you, that we English seek to take your ships and colonies. We seek to beat the life and soul out of Hitler and Hitlerism. That alone, that all time, that to the end. We do not covet anything from any nation except their respect. Those Frenchmen who are in the French Empire, and those who in are so-called Unoccupied-France, may see their way form time to time to useful action. I will not go into details. Hostile ears are listening. As for those, to whom English hearts go out in full, because they see them under the sharp discipline, oppression, and spying the Hun - as to those Frenchmen in the occupied regions, to them I say, when they think of the future let them remember the words which Gambetta, that great Frenchman, uttered after 1870 about the future of France and what was to come: "Think of it always: speak of it never."

Good night then: sleep to gather strength for the morning. For the morning will come. Brightly will it shine om the brave and true, kindly upon all who suffer for the cause, glorious upon the tombs of heroes. Thus will shine the dawn. Vive la France! Long live also the forward march of the common people in all the lands towards their just and true inheritance, and towards the broader and fuller age.

Churchill, Winston. Their finest hour. Páginas 451-453.

de Gaulle

Sobre a difícil situação de apoiar de Gaule, e manter, ao mesmo tempo, relações com a França de Vichy, Churchill fala sobre o relacionamente entre de Gaulle e a Inglaterra.

This mood was hard upon de Gaulle, who had risked all and kept the flag flying, but whose handful of followers outside France could never claim to be an effective alternative French Government. Nevertheless we did our utmost to increase his influence, authority, and power. He for his part naturally resented any kind of truck on our part with Vichy, and thought we ought to be exclusively loyal to him. He also felt it to be essential to his position before the French people that he should maintain a proud and haughty demeanor towards "perfidious Albion", although an exile, dependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midst. He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance. He even one day explained this technique to me, and I fully comprehended the extraordinary difficulties of his problem. I always admired his massive strength.

Churchill, Winston. Their Finest Hour. Página 451.